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In this paper we address the question of whether it is possible to obtain evidence that we are in
a superposition of different ‘worlds’, as suggested by the relative state interpretation of quantum
mechanics. We find that it is impossible to find definitive proof, and that if one wishes to retain
reliable memories of which ‘world’ one was in, no evidence at all can be found. We then show that
even for completely linear quantum state evolution, there is a test that can be done to tell if you
can be placed in a superposition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanical objects can be placed in a super-
position of states. How large these superpositions can
be is very much an open question, particularly given the
possibility of the existence of intrinsic universal decoher-
ence processes that resolve the measurement problem,
or limitations suggested by some variations of quantum
gravity [1]. It is also a key question to answer given that
macroscopic superpositions are critical to proposed new
quantum technologies [2]. The relative state interpreta-
tion (RSI) of quantum mechanics, as originally devised
by Everett, admits no upper limit, and strongly suggests
that we are all in macroscopic superposition states. It is
often suggested that in a universe that evolves linearly,
it is impossible to test whether we are in such a superpo-
sition, and therefore that the truth of this proposition is
not a question that can be addressed by scientific method.
This paper will show that it is formally impossible to de-
termine whether we are currently in a superposition, but
that it is possible, at least in principle, to determine ex-
perimentally whether we can be placed in such a super-
position.
The RSI assumes that there is no physical process
of wavefunction collapse upon a measurement, and that
the quantum state of the universe only ever undergoes
unitary evolution [3, 4]. With no wavefunction col-
lapse process, there is nothing preventing arbitrarily large
systems becoming entangled, including human experi-
menters. This possibility, which historically has been
seen as very confronting [5], is precisely how the RSI ex-
plains the fact that our everyday experiences seem clearly
single-valued. If we assume that our experiences are a di-
rect function of the state of our physical brains, then if
a brain goes into a superposition while entangled with
some quantum system and a measuring apparatus, then
the resulting state is best described as a superposition of
“quasi-classical” experiences, in which each brain state is
entangled with a single measurement result.
The RSI requires the fewest axioms to describe, but
requires considerable development to explain the quasi-
classical experience. Unlike most interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics, it requires no definition of measurement
to be complete. Unlike the Copenhagen-style interpreta-
tions, it has no divide between the quantum and classical
world, and is a complete theory that makes firm predic-
tions about mesoscopic systems. With no non-local evo-
lution at all, it is entirely compatible with all relativis-
tic theories. Any theory that makes predictions exactly
as though there were nothing but unitary evolution, we
will regard as in an equivalence class with the RSI the-
ory. Fully defined quantum theories that enforce single-
valuedness typically introduce a physical wavefunction
collapse process [6, 7]. Any wavefunction collapse pro-
cess will reduce the coherence of subsequent experiments,
and these theories choose their parameters such that this
collapse is undetectably slow on the scale of current quan-
tum experiments, and undetectably fast for macroscopic
superpositions.
It is well-known how to determine if an external sys-
tem is in a superposition of distinct states. For example,
Eibenberger et al. [8] demonstrate that molecules exceed-
ing a mass of 10,000 amu can be put into a superposi-
tion of different spatial positions. Scaling this process
up will either be impossible due to physical decoherence
processes such as wavefunction collapse, or else simply a
function of technology. In principle, doing the same thing
to a cat or a human is a question of scale. If it were pos-
sible to demonstrate that another human could be in a
superposition, then we might be inclined to believe that
something like the RSI is correct. What is perhaps less
clear is how to determine if oneself is in a superposi-
tion of distinct quasi-classical states, or if such a thing is
possible. Some previous proposed tests of the RSI, such
as [9] and [10], have not addressed this aspect. Other
proposed tests (e.g. [11, Chapter 8]) purport to cause
someone to become aware that they are in a superposi-
tion of different mental states, but these treatments do
not correctly account for the non-orthogonality of states
in superpositions and states not in a superposition. This
paper will examine tests that demand contrasting results
for states in a superposition and those not in a superpo-
sition. We will show that it is not possible to determine
experimentally whether one’s own mind is currently in
a superposition, though it is possible to show that the
process can occur.
2II. ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENTS
This paper examines the potential experiments that
can be performed in a universe that is completely deter-
mined by a state vector living in a complex Hilbert space
with unitary time evolution. When we say that a sub-
space of this state is an “experimenter” who is capable of
believing things, we assume that those beliefs are purely
the function of the state of that subspace. In practice,
we imagine this subspace to be something like the exper-
imenter’s brain, though the precise details of the scope
of these structures is not important, providing it can be
encoded within the larger Hilbert space.
One detail that is required for our proofs is that any
two states of the universe where the experimenter be-
lieves contradictory things must be orthogonal. Under
any standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, if two
states are not orthogonal, then it is not possible to dis-
tinguish between the two with perfect fidelity, which we
assume must be possible for contradictory beliefs.
To illustrate how these non-probabilistic assumptions
will be used, we give a definition and then prove a simple
lemma:
Definition 1. Say that states of the universe |1〉 and
|2〉 are distinguishable by the experimenter (or simply
distinguishable) if there is some unitary transformation
Uˆ such that the experimenter believes something different
in Uˆ |1〉 and Uˆ |2〉.
Lemma 1. Distinguishable states are orthogonal.
Proof. 〈1|2〉 = 〈1|Uˆ †Uˆ |2〉. By hypothesis, Uˆ |1〉 and Uˆ |2〉
contain experimenters that believe different things, so
〈1|Uˆ †Uˆ |2〉 = 0. Therefore, 〈1|2〉 = 0.
What this lemma tells us is that if two states are dis-
tinguishable, there must be some unitary transformation
that takes them to an orthogonal state. Since unitary
transformations preserve inner products, the states must
have been orthogonal to begin with. This definition and
lemma could be easily operated in reverse, and we could
motivate that contradictory beliefs must be orthogonal
by noting that they can be created by performing an ex-
periment that distinguishes between two completely dis-
tinct (orthogonal) initial states.
III. ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING
PROBABILITY
Later we shall investigate experimental tests of
whether one is in a superposition that do not give defini-
tive answers, but still produce non-identical quantum
states consisting of superpositions of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ an-
swers. This is interpreted as a probabilistic outcome in
all interpretations of quantum mechanics, although there
is much debate over the validity of doing this in the RSI
(see for example [12]).While it can be shown that the
Born rule is the unique way to assign valid probabilities
[3], and can also be justified through considerations of
decision theory [4] or of self-locating uncertainty [13], for
our purposes we shall simply assume that one can sen-
sibly talk about probabilities. That is to say, if the ex-
perimenter measures the spin of an electron in the state
α |↑〉+β |↓〉, we will make statements such as “The proba-
bility of the experimenter measuring ↑ is |α|2”, while also
maintaining that both outcomes of the measurement ac-
tually happen, and that the whole experiment proceeds
in an entirely deterministic manner.
The question that this paper asks is: “if the RSI
were correct, giving a satisfactory account of probability,
and we were in a large-scale superposition of so-called
‘worlds’, would we be able to test this?”, without consid-
ering the plausibility or lack thereof of the premise.
IV. IMPOSSIBLE TYPES OF SUPERPOSITION
TESTS
The first type of superposition test that we might want
is a definitive one: that is, one that will definitely give
a “Yes” answer if the universe started out in a superpo-
sition, and definitely give a “No” answer if the universe
did not. This motivates our next definition:
Definition 2. Call a unitary operator TˆD a definitive
superposition test if for each |i〉,
TˆD |i〉 =
∑
j
βij |Nij〉
and
TˆD
(∑
i
αi |i〉
)
=
∑
k
γk |Yk〉
for some set of αi, where ‖
∑
i αi |i〉 ‖ = 1, and such that
each pair of |Nij〉 and |Yk〉 are distinguishable.
The states |Nij〉 are negative results (‘No, I wasn’t in
a superposition’) and the |Yk〉 are positive results (‘Yes,
I was in a superposition’).
Theorem 1. No definitive superposition test exists.
Proof. Suppose that TˆD were a definitive superposition
test. Then, we would have
TˆD
(∑
i
αi |i〉
)
=
∑
k
γk |Yk〉
=
∑
i
αiTˆD |i〉
=
∑
ij
αiβij |Nij〉
3However, since each |Nij〉 and |Yk〉 is distinguishable, we
have
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k
γk |Yk〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
(∑
k
γ∗k 〈Yk|
)∑
ij
αiβij |Nij〉


=
∑
ijk
γ∗kαiβij 〈Yk|Nij〉
= 0
However,
∑
i αi |i〉 was normalised and TˆD was unitary
by hypothesis. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
As perhaps expected, the linearity and unitarity of the
evolution makes it impossible to prove that we are in a
superposition. Upon learning this, we might want to set-
tle for a test that had inconclusive results, but at least
some definite ‘Yes’ results. In this way, if we ever experi-
ence a definite ‘Yes’, then we have learned that we were
in a superposition. This leads us to the next definition:
Definition 3. Call a unitary operator TˆPD a partially-
definitive superposition test if
TˆPD |i〉 =
∑
j
βij |Nij〉 , and
TˆPD
(∑
i
αi |i〉
)
=
∑
ij
γij |Nij〉+
∑
k
ζk |Yk〉
for some set of αi, where ‖
∑
i αi |i〉 ‖ = 1,
∑
k ζk |Yk〉 is
non-zero, and such that each pair of |Nij〉 and |Yk〉 are
distinguishable.
We note that this time, the states |Nij〉 stand for ‘No
result’, as we have not definitively shown that we are not
in a superposition when we are in that state. This is
still a contradictory belief to all states |Yk〉, as they have
clearly resolved disagreement over whether the test has
returned a definitive result.
Theorem 2. No partially-definitive superposition test
exists.
Proof. Suppose that TˆPD were a partially-definitive su-
perposition test. Then, we would have
TˆPD
(∑
i
αi |i〉
)
=
∑
ij
γij |Nij〉+
∑
k
ζk |Yk〉
=
∑
i
αiTˆPD |i〉
=
∑
ij
αiβij |Nij〉
∑
k
ζk |Yk〉 =
∑
ij
(αiβij − γij) |Nij〉
However, since each |Nij〉 and |Yk〉 is distinguishable,
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k
ζk |Yk〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
(∑
k
ζ∗k 〈Yk|
)∑
ij
(αiβij − γij) |Nij〉


=
∑
ijk
ζ∗k(αiβij − γij) 〈Yk|Nij〉
= 0
Therefore,
∑
k ζk |Yk〉 is the zero vector, a contradiction.
We next wonder if we could construct some probabilis-
tic test of whether we were in a superposition. We would
like this test to allow reliable ‘memories’ of the distin-
guishable branches that the experimenter was in imme-
diately before the test. Without this ability for the test to
preserve memory, it is impossible to answer the question:
“Am I, right now, in a superposition, even though my
world currently seems quasi-classical?”, as those quasi-
classical experiences must be destroyed by the test itself.
This leads us to the formal definition:
Definition 4. Call a unitary operator TˆBD a branch-
discriminating probabilistic superposition test if
TˆBD |i〉 =
∑
j
(βij |Nij〉+ γij |Yij〉), and
TˆBD
(∑
i
αi |i〉
)
=
∑
ij
(ζij |Nij〉+ ηij |Yij〉)
for some set of αi such that ‖
∑
i αi |i〉 ‖ = 1, each pair
of |Nij〉 and |Yi′j′ 〉 is distinguishable, |Yij〉 and |Yi′j′ 〉 are
distinguishable for i 6= i′, and there exists some i such
that ∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
γij |Yij〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
<
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ηij |Yij〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
The condition that |Yij〉 and |Yi′j′ 〉 are distinguishable
encodes our desire to be able to discriminate between
before-test branches after the test, and the condition
that ‖∑j γij |Yij〉 ‖2 < ‖∑j ηij |Yij〉 ‖2 ensures that for
at least one of the branches, there is some set of ‘Yes’ out-
comes that, taken together, are more likely if you are in
a superposition than if you were in a single-valued state.
Theorem 3. No branch-discriminating probabilistic su-
perposition test exists.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
〈Yij |Yik〉 = δjk – that is, that the ‘Yes’ states for each
branch are orthogonal to each other. If not, we can find
an orthonormal basis for the span of the |Yij〉 (with fixed
i and variable j) and write the superpositions in terms of
4these bases. This preserves squared norm and orthogo-
nality of |Yij〉 and |Yi′j′〉, and means that the probabilis-
tic condition may be restated as
∑
j
|γij |2 <
∑
j
|ηij |2
Now, by linearity,
∑
ij
(ζij |Nij〉+ ηij |Yij〉) =
∑
ij
(αiβij |Nij〉+ αiγij |Yij〉)
By taking the inner product of both sides with each of
the |Yij〉, we see that ηij = αiγij , and therefore that
∑
j
|ηij |2 =
∑
j
|αi|2|γij |2
≤
∑
j
|γij |2
This contradicts our probabilistic condition.
V. ALLOWABLE TESTS
The previous theorems do not rule out working su-
perposition tests. Theorems 1 and 2 show that such a
test must be probabilistic, and theorem 3 shows that no
probabilistic test is possible when the memories of being
in each part of the superposition are retained. In other
words, in order to produce the necessary interference that
can determine the existence of a superposition, multiple
branches must be coupled to exactly the same final state,
including states of belief of the experimenter.
Tests of this kind are schematically rather simple. Sup-
pose that the initial state of the universe is either |1〉, |2〉,
or (|1〉 + |2〉)/√2. Then, we could have a test Tˆ defined
by Tˆ |1〉 = (|N〉+|Y 〉)/√2 and Tˆ |2〉 = (− |N〉+|Y 〉)/√2.
Then, by linearity, Tˆ (|1〉 + |2〉)/√2 = |Y 〉, i.e. the out-
comes interfere, so finding oneself in |Y 〉 is evidence that
one was originally in a superposition.
To picture this test, imagine an experimenter who
wants to perform an experiment that would distinguish
between the RSI and any objective collapse interpreta-
tion. They enter an isolated machine with a piece of
blank paper and an electron in the spin state (|↑〉 +
|↓〉)/√2. The machine can apply arbitrary unitary trans-
formations to its contents. Inside, the experimenter mea-
sures the electron in the {|↑〉 , |↓〉} basis. If the RSI is
correct, the resulting state is (|↑〉 |E[↑]〉+ |↓〉 |E[↓]〉)/√2,
where |E[↑]〉 is the state of the experimenter seeing a
spin-up electron, and |E[↓]〉 is the state of the exper-
imenter seeing an spin-down electron. If an objective
collapse interpretation is correct, the resulting state is
either |↑〉 |E[↑]〉 or |↓〉 |E[↓]〉 with equal probability. The
enclosing machine then applies any transformation to the
room satisfying
|↑〉 |E[↑]〉 → (|N〉+ |Y 〉)/
√
2
|↓〉 |E[↓]〉 → (− |N〉+ |Y 〉)/
√
2
The experimenter’s memories are uncorrelated to the
measurement of the electron, but the piece of paper says
“No” if they happen to be in the state |N〉, and “Yes”
if they happen to be in the state |Y 〉. They then walk
outside and put their piece of paper on a table. The
experiment can then be repeated an arbitrary number of
times.
Over time, if there is a roughly equal number of “No”
and “Yes” results, then the experimenter can become
confident that the experiment is showing that they are
not existing as a coherent superposition of states within
the device. Alternatively, if all of the results say “Yes”,
then the experimenter has evidence of having been per-
sonally in a superposition, thus giving an arbitrary degree
of confidence in the RSI.
We also note that this test relies crucially on both
the ‘memory loss’ experienced by the experimenter, and
the knowledge of the phase of the initial superposition.
The full quantum state of the experimenter, including
their memories, is being generated by the machine. This
means that it is possible for them to have any memories
at all, but we have shown that they must be identical
across multiple branches of the superposition, and there-
fore cannot be correlated with the actual relevant mea-
surement results. The previous test proposed by Deutsch
[9]shows that it is theoretically possible to show that a
separate sentient being can be placed in a superposition,
our allowable test shows that it is also possible for an ex-
perimenter to show that they themselves can be placed
in a superposition.
By noting the equality of the density matrices, it is
trivial to show that no experiment can distinguish be-
tween a complete lack of knowledge of the phase of the
initial superposition and a stochastic mixture of single-
5ρˆ =
∫
2pi
0
dφ1
2pi
∫
2pi
0
dφ2
2pi
· · ·
∫
2pi
0
dφN
2pi

∑
j
eiφjαj |j〉



∑
j′
e−iφj′α∗j′ 〈j′|


=
∑
j
αjα
∗
j |j〉 〈j|
This emphasises that it is never possible to prove exper-
imentally that a system is in an arbitrary superposition,
only in a specific superposition. So it is only possible to
aspire to prove that we can be put into a specific super-
position of quasi-classical states.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that experiments that show increasingly large
coherences can narrow the parameter regime in which
spontaneous collapse theories might exist, but there is
an enormous gap between current experiments and co-
herence experiments on truly macroscopic objects. To
make things even more challenging, while the majority
of spontaneous collapse theories depend only on system
size to define a decoherence rate, there are some theories
that postulate the existence of genuinely classical objects
and/or fields, although there are strong constraints on
such theories [14]. Therefore, to avoid all loopholes, it
would be eventually be necessary to include an actual
sentient being in the interference experiment. This pa-
per characterises the limits of extending that experiment
to its logical conclusion - personal experience.
We have characterised the limitations on potential
tests of the RSI, showing that they cannot be defini-
tive, and probabilistic tests must be unable to retain
any knowledge of the contradictory beliefs held during
a macroscopic superposition. We show that it is never-
theless theoretically possible to demonstrate that oneself
can be placed in a superposition of distinct quasi-classical
states to any degree of certainty (below absolute) that is
desired.
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